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Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are used in many
critical infrastructures to provide 24/7 system monitoring and control different
type of operations. Thus, they control nations vital assets such as water desali-
nation, power plants and nuclear power generation. With the aim of enhancing
efficiency and reducing costs, SCADA systems are connected with corporate net-
works or Internet. However, such connectivity leads to significant increase in
security attacks against SCADA systems because of the lack of proper and ded-
icated security solutions for such systems. Therefore, it is important to protect
SCADA systems and install countermeasures against cyber attacks.
A Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) is a very common industrial control sys-
tem device used to control output devices based on data received (and processed)
xi
from input devices. Given the central role that PLCs play in deployed industrial
control systems, it has been a preferred target of ICS attackers. A quick search in
the ICS-CERT repository reveals that out of a total of 589 advisories, more than
80 target PLCs. Stuxnet attack, considered the most famous reported incident on
ICS, targeted mainly PLCs. Most of the PLC reported incidents are rooted in the
fact that the PLC being accessed in an unauthorized way. This research aims at
studying SCADA network attacks and develop detection and mitigation techniques.
We investigated the PLC access control problem. We discussed several access con-
trol models but we focused mainly on the commonly adopted password-based access
control. We showed how such password-based mechanism can be compromised in
a realistic scenario as well as the list the attacks that can be derived as a conse-







 هارون عبدالعليم وردك االسم الكامل:
 عنوان الرسالة: الهجمات األمنية ضد آلية حماية الوصول في أنظمة سكادا: استكشاف الشبكة
 أمن وضمان املعلومات التخصص:
 2016ديسمرب  تاريخ الدرجة العلمية:
تستخدم أنظمة التحكم اإلشرافية وجتميع البيانات )سكادا( يف العديد من البىن التحتية احليوية لتوفري 
مراقبة النظام والسيطرة على أنواع خمتلفة من العمليات على مدار الساعة وبالتايل، فإهنا تنظم وتتحكم 
ليد الكهرباء وتوليد الطاقة النووية. وهبدف تعزيز على منشآت الدولة احليوية مثل حتلية املياه وحمطات تو 
الكفاءة وخفض التكاليف، تُوّصل أنظمة سكادا بشبكة املنشأة واإلنرتنت. ولكن هذا الربط يؤدي إىل 
زيادة كبرية يف اهلجمات األمنية ضد أنظمة سكادا بسبب عدم وجود حلول أمنية مناسبة وخمصصة ملثل 
 م جداً محايتها واستخدام التدابري املضادة ضد اهلجمات السيربانية. هذه األنظمة. ولذلك، من امله
( هو جهاز حتكم صناعي يستخدم Programable Logic Controllerجهاز التحكم )
للتحكم يف املشغالت امليكانيكية استنادًا إىل البيانات املستلمة واملعاجلة من أجهزة االستشعار. ونظراً 
( يف أنظمة سكادا املنتشرة، فقد أصبح اهلدف املفضل للمهامجني. كما PLCه )للدور احملوري الذي تلعب
تنبيهاً، أكثر من  589أنه من أصل ( ICS-CERT) تبني من خالل حبث سريع يف قاعدة بيانات
 بشكل خاص. (PLC)تستهدف  80
بشكل ت على سكادا، استهدف ، الذي يعترب احلادث األشهر يف تقارير اهلجما(Stuxnet) هجوم
يتم بطريقة اخرتاق آلية التحكم يف ( PLC) وكشفت هذه التقارير أن اهلجوم على (.PLC) رئيسي
بطريقة غري مصرح هبا. لذلك، هتدف هذه األطروحة لدراسة اهلجمات على شبكة  (PLC) الدخول إىل
آليات  سكادا وتطوير تقنيات كشف اهلجمات والتخفيف من آثارها. كما هتدف إىل التحقيق ومناقشة
. وركز البحث بشكل رئيسي على التحكم يف الوصول املعتمد على (PLC)التحكم يف الدخول إىل 
كلمة املرور. كما أظهر البحث كيف ميكن اخرتاق هذه اآللية يف جتربة واقعية وكذلك قائمة اهلجمات اليت 
من القوانني للكشف عن أي ميكن أن تُنفذ نتيجة هلذا االخرتاق. وباإلضافة إىل ذلك، مت إنشاء جمموعة 
 .(PLC)حماولة ملهامجة 
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Industrial control systems (ICS) is a general term denoting several computer-based
control systems that involve Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
systems, Distributed Control Systems (DCS) and Process Control System (PCS).
SCADA are process control systems which are commonly deployed to continuously
monitor and control industrial facilities to guarantee proper functioning. SCADA
is mainly composed of Human Machine Interface (HMI) that runs a SCADA soft-
ware to present the actual status of ongoing operations and processes of industry.
Data is being sent to HMI by Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) such as Pro-
grammable Logic Controllers (PLCs) or Remote Terminal Unites (RTUs) through
a communication network. IEDs are collecting data from sensors, send it to Mas-
ter Terminal Unit (MTU) which is a central server processing the inputs and send
command back to IEDs which in turn send it to an actuator to adjust the status of
an equipment device (e.g. valve). Figure 1.1 illustrated typical SCADA network.
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Figure 1.1: Typical SCADA Network Topology
These systems are used in many critical infrastructures to provide 24/7 system
monitoring and control different type of operations. They are commonly used
to control organization’s and nation’s vital assets such as water refineries, power
plants, nuclear power generators, etc. A failure in these systems may lead to
catastrophic consequences not only in terms of financial losses but also in terms
of human lives.
1.1 Motivation and Scope
Historically, the priority was given to system reliability and availability while
security was considered a minor issue. ICS systems security was relying on the
use of proprietary devices and protocols without publicly available documentation
(security by obscurity). In addition, ICS networks were typically isolated from
other networks (corporate LANs, Internet, etc.). In recent years, most ICS
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systems became connected (directly or indirectly) to the Internet. This can
be explained by the need for sharing real-time information with the business
operations which is now a necessity in order to improve efficiency, minimize costs,
and maximize profits. As a consequence, ICS devices are increasingly required
to support mainstream protocols in order to communicate with a broader range
of networks and devices. This, however, exposes ICS devices to various types of
exploitation which is particularly relevant for Programmable Logic Controllers.
Over the past five years, there was a period of sharp growth in the number of
vulnerabilities, reflecting that industrial systems are gaining the attention of not
only the researchers and system owners but also potential attackers. the index
has increased from 19 vulnerabilities in 2010 to 189 vulnerabilities in 2015. And
this number keeps growing, more and more information about vulnerabilities in
these systems is becoming public. For 26 of the vulnerabilities published in 2015,
exploits are available [1].
Figure 1.2: Number of Vulnerabilities over The Past Five Years
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A Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) is an important component in an ICS
system. It is a control device used to automate industrial processes via collecting
input data from field devices such as sensors, processing it, then send commands
to actuators devices such as motors. Being a pivotal device in ICS systems, PLCs
are preferred target for cyber security attacks. ICS-CERT, the repository for ICS
specific incidents, includes a large number of PLC related issues. A quick search
performed in November 2016 reveals that out of a total of 589 advisories, 89
target directly PLCs and out of a total of 114 alerts, 17 involve PLCs. Another
manifestation of the exposure of PLCs to cyber security attacks is the Stuxnet
malware [2] which is designed to attack primarily PLCs of the Iranian nuclear
facility.
PLC security issues range from simple DoS to sophisticated remote code
execution vulnerabilities. Most of PLC attacks are possible because attackers
could have access and compromise the PLC device. In addition, SCADA
protocols suffer from insufficient authentication or integrity checking mechanism,
which expose SCADA systems to cyber attacks when connected to external
networks. That is because security was not the priority when these protocols
were first designed. Recently, many researches have been conducted in the mean
of detection the attempts of the attacks and develop techniques to prevent them
from damaging the systems.
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The communication patterns in SCADA network is assumed to be well-
behaved, predictable flow patterns. ICS systems have fixed topology with limited
number of network devices, protocols and application running. Most of SCADA
communications are generated in a polling manner. The server demands a client
for a data and a client starts a communication, i.e. HMI requests a PLC for
sensors measurements or sends commands to the actuators. By this assumption,
it is feasible to model normal operations traffic or signatures to discover if there
is a malicious action that violate the models.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) mainly uses one of two detection tech-
niques: Anomaly-based IDS and Signature-based IDS. The latter technique
monitors the network packets and compares them with a database of signatures
of malicious threats. This type of IDS has high accuracy rates in detecting
known attacks. On the other hand, anomaly-based detection is very useful for
new attacks as it depends on the behavior of normal operations or resources
accessed by operations. In this case, network patterns should be well configured
to avoid false negative alarm for harmful use or false positive alarm for legitimate
use. Usually, the best practice of IDS is using a hybrid IDS which is based on
signatures as well as network anomaly behavior.
In this work, we discuss the different access control models for PLCs, but
we focus on the most commonly deployed access control mechanism, namely,
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password-based access control. Using recent PLC devices (2016) with updated
firmware, we show how passwords are stored in PLC memory, how passwords can
be intercepted in the network, how they can be cracked, etc. As a consequence
of these vulnerabilities, we could carry out advanced attacks on ICS system
setup, such as replay, PLC memory corruption, etc. In addition, we developed
signature-based IDS to identify normal from abnormal operations in SCADA
network.
1.2 Thesis Contribution
In what follows is the outline of the contribution of this research:
• We carry out a detailed study of the PLC access control problem.
• We propose a set of traffic analysis attacks on the communication between
the ES and the PLC.
• We show how PLC access control authentication can be broken.
• We design and implement a set of PLC commands detection techniques
based on network signatures.
1.3 Thesis Organization
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 lists and briefly describes
related work. Chapter 3 is a summary of the most common PLC vulnerabilities
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as reported in the ICS-CERT repository. The different access control models and
a security analysis of the PLC password access control model are described in
Chapter 4. In the light of the security analysis, Chapter 5 shows the possible
attacks that can be launched as a consequence. Chapter 6 presents detection
techniques of different attacks we conducted in this research. Finally, in Chapter





This chapter highlights recent works in the area of ICS security particularly, at-
tacks on PLC. In addition, it reviews research about SCADA network detection
and prevention techniques.
2.1 PLC Security
Although many cybersecurity incidents targeted ICS systems in the past 20 years,
it was only after the Stuxnet [2] malware hit Iranian nuclear facilities that ICS
security turned into a high priority topic. Stuxnet incident was a wake up call
for those still not realizing the severe consequences of ICS security breaches [3].
Adopting a holistic approach to ICS security analysis, Johnson showed that
ICS systems are designed in levels and there are gaps in the existing security
measurements used, in particular, in SCADA systems [4]. He proposed two
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attack vectors to exploit PLC vulnerabilities, namely, bypass logic attack which
is based on compromising the PLC internal RAM and brute force output attack
that results in arbitrary commands sent to the PLC. The described attacks did
not assume a flaw in the PLC. Instead, a PLC can be attacked through its
normal operation given a network access. Morris and Gao showed that attacks
resulting in consequences similar to Stuxnet can be achieved with relatively
simple scenarios [5]. They described 17 attacks on SCADA devices (RTUs, PLCs,
etc.) exploiting vulnerabilities in Modbus protocol. Very close to our work, in
a BlackHat talk, Beresford demonstrated a number of vulnerabilities in Siemens
Simatic PCS7 software including replay attacks, authentication bypass, finger-
printing and remote exploitation using Metasploit framework [6]. This paper
deviates from Beresford’s demonstrations since our attacks are more interactive
and use the recent and more secure versions of the PCS7 software as well as
the more up to date firmware of Siemens PLC S7-400. As a generalization of
Beresford’s attacks, Milinkovic and Lazic reviewed a set of commercial Operating
Systems running on PLCs of major vendors, highlighting serious vulnerabilities
with some experiments of few attacks conducted on ControlLogix PLC [7].
As mentioned above, a major PLC attack vector consists in exploiting
weaknesses in the communication protocols or their implementations, such as
MODBUS, MODBUS/TCP, etc. Byres et al. investigated commonly used ICS
protocols with the aim of finding defects that caused the devices to respond in
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inappropriate manners or to inject malicious packets in the normal traffic [8].
Closer to our work, Sandaruwan et al. showed how to attack Siemens S7 PLCs
by exploiting flaws in the ISO-TSAP (Transport Service Access Point) protocol
used for data exchange between controllers and PLCs [9].
Another family of PLC related attacks is the PLC Firmware modification
attack. PLC firmware is the operating system of the PLC embedded device.
PLC firmware needs to be installed and updated frequently. If the firmware
update is not thoroughly verified and validated, attackers may craft malicious
firmware and use it to compromise PLCs. Basnight et al. studied the firmware
attack development process and demonstrated a successful attempt of uploading
a modified firmware to an Allen-Bradley ControlLogix L61 PLC [10]. Costin et
al. pushed the idea to a larger scale by carrying out a large-scale analysis of
about 32,000 firmware images [11].
A significant body of work in the literature focuses on security solutions
for ICS systems which yield several countermeasures to reinforce the security of
such systems. These can be classified into communication protocols improve-
ment [12, 13], and firewalls, filtering methods, DMZs [4, 7, 9]. However, unlike
typical IT systems, it is impractical and cost-effective to embrace several layers
of mitigations due to performance and availability considerations.
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2.2 Intrusion Detection System
As mentioned above, SCADA systems have exposed to wide variety of attacks
since Stuxnet, which may cause catastrophic consequences for the nation’s
economy and even worse to human lives. These attacks encouraged researchers
to look for algorithms of defending in order to stop or mitigate these damages.
Authors in [14] highlighted the challenges involved in securing control systems.
However, the solutions currently in use or proposed in literature either are
developed for certain SCADA system protocol, which are not applicable to
others, or have some limitations in detecting certain attacks.
The basic idea of signature-based intrusion detection systems is trying to
recognize predefined malicious patterns (virus) in network traffic flow and signal
an alarm if it has taken place. This approach has key advantage: its false
alarm rate is very low, if any. Thomas Morris et al. [15] derived a set of
50 signature-based IDS rules from vulnerability analysis of Modbus/TCP and
Modbus over serial line systems. The rules are generic that can be used for
multiple IDS platforms. In addition, they used Quickdraw Snort preprocessor
[16] and other Snort rules to detect malicious activities on Modbus communica-
tion networks. Oman and Phillips [17] produced comprehensive signatures for
unauthorized access to SCADA devices in electrical power grid which supporting
several protocols, such as DNP3, Modbus and RTU/ASCII protocols. The IDS
maintains SCADA devices details in XML profile such as IP address, Telnet port,
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etc. It uses Perl programming for parsing the XML profiles and created Snort
rules for legal commands on the RTU. For evaluating the performance of the
system, they developed a SCADA/sensor testbed.
However, the previous technique can be bypassed with a simple modifica-
tion in the attack scheme and has limitation in detecting new attacks. These
facts have motivated the research towards anomaly-based IDS for SCADA
networks. This detection technique is feasible due to the thoughts that SCADA
is well-behaved networks, means that it is predictable environment. Garitano et
al. [18] provided a survey of the research effort focused on the development of
anomaly detection for SCADA systems. Cardenas et al. [14] proposed algorithm
for attack detection using mathematical framework. The idea of this approach
is to understand the behavior of physical processes then analyze the network to
detect any modification in control commands or sensor data. Authors in [19]
designed model-based IDS for Modbus TCP/IP SCADA networks. Basically,
it checks Modbus TCP requests and responses to detect any violation to the
standards of the protocol, violation in the communication between components
and detects service availability. The main drawbacks of this system that it
detects commands with malicious code or response validity; it cannot detect at-
tacks with valid commands. Also, it is specific only to Modbus TCP/IP networks.
Ramachandruni and Poornachandra [20] took advantage of honeypots to
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mimic the services of control systems (HMI, Modbus). It used to attract
attackers and monitor network attack vectors. The goal of this research is to
analyze attackers activities and build models of attacking methodologies. The
authors recommend to utilize honeypot system which can help in identifying more
attack vectors, report and share it to prevent future attacks on SCADA systems.
Alternative technique in anomaly-based IDS is neural network algorithm. The
performance of this method depend essentially on the training data set and the
selected input features of the network traffic. Although research efforts in neural
network are still at an early stage but such works [21] [22] have shown the
effectiveness of this method as the most appropriate tool for anomaly detection.
Anomaly-based IDS has clear drawback; it may issue high false positive or
false negative alerts if the model was not well configured. Thus, hybrid intrusion
detection system get benefits of both, signature-based and anomaly-based
technique [23] to improve IDS performance and enhance alarm accuracy. The
cool advantage of this type is that it is capable in detecting known attacks as
well as zero-day attacks. The works in [24] and [25] proposed ruled-based
intrusion detection system for SCADA networks using IEC 60870-5-104 protocol.
This IDS using signature-based rules to detect some abnormal events on this
protocol. Also, it uses model-based techniques contains protocol fields analysis
and communications analysis to identify unexpected behavior of the protocol.
Valdes and Cheung [26] adopted a multi-layered model-based IDS which can be
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deployed in both, the network and host level. The IDS is combining model-based
and complemented by signature-based approach and using Snort for detection.
It was evaluated using Modbus and DNP3 over TCP/IP protocol.
2.3 Summary
This chapter highlighted a variety of related works in SCADA security area. Part
of them investigated in the attacks against PLC, while others conducted their
researches in finding a solutions and mitigation techniques to detect and prevent
such attacks. Our work deviates from existing works by targeting initial com-
munication between PLC and engineering station (e.g. PCS7) for configuration
or re-programming the PLC. In addition, we contribute to the knowledge in the





A PLC is a particular type of industrial embedded devices that is programmed
to manage, control and continuously monitor the state of physical components
(motors, valves, sensors, etc.) based on system inputs and custom requirements.
A PLC typically has three main components, namely, an embedded operating
system, control system software, and analog and digital inputs/outputs. Hence,
a PLC can be considered as a special digital computer executing specific instruc-
tions that collect data from input devices (e.g. sensors), sending commands to
output devices (e.g. valves), and transmitting data to a central operations center.
PLCs are commonly found in supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
systems as field devices. Because they contain a programmable memory, PLCs al-
lows a customizable control of physical components through a user-programmable
interface. There are many languages used to program a PLC in a variety of ways.
Ladder Logic (LAD) is the most commonly used, Statement List (STL), Function
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Block Diagram (FBD), etc. It can also be programmed by high level languages
such as C.
Nowadays, PLCs are used in just about every critical process in many dif-
ferent industries. If an attacker successfully compromises a PLC, he has the
ability to shut down the PLC, overwrite PLC logic or values, perform code
injection, to name a few. While some of these attacks may result in information
disclosure, others can give a false system state, harm the PLC device physically,
and in an extreme case, lead to human injury and loss.
The ICS-CERT repository, dedicated to ICS related security incidents, in-
cludes several reports involving PLC vulnerabilities and alerts. Most of the
reports are relatively recent (2010 and later). The increase in ICS and PLC
incidents coincides with the increasing interconnection of ICS and corporate
networks which became a necessity to improve efficiency, minimize costs, and
maximize profits. This, however, exposes ICS systems, and PLCs in particular,
to various types of exploitation.
Most of PLC vulnerabilities can be grouped into three categories, namely,




The network architecture and protocols of an ICS system have a great impact
on its vulnerability to external attacks. Previously, to guarantee ICS security,
PLCs were deployed inside an ’air-gapped’ network, isolated physically from
other networks and facilities, plus, using proprietary protocols. However, recent
incidents proved to be ineffective way of protection. Moreover, with the optimal
productivity needs of modern critical infrastructures, PLCs are increasingly
required to be interconnected with corporate LANs, Intranets, and Internet. As
a result, PLCs are expected to support mainstream network protocols. Such
standard protocols (e.g. TCP, IP, ARP, etc.) facilitate interconnection with
multiple devices of different vendors, but bring their own vulnerabilities (e.g.
Spoofing, Replay, MITM, etc.). Consequently, any ICS protocol based on the
standard protocols will inherit their vulnerabilities.
Another source of PLC vulnerabilities is the set of additional features that
typically come with PLCs, such as web servers, FTP servers, e-mail sending
capabilities, etc. Each one of these features come with its own implementation
vulnerabilities (e.g. server software flaws, web application flaws, etc.). Exploits
for these flaws exist publicly and can be leveraged to compromise PLC devices
in a variety of ways, such as updating PLC firmware, disrupting PLC services, etc.
However, the most common type of network vulnerabilities is related to
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ICS specific network protocols such as Modbus, profinet, DNP3, etc. In particu-
lar, Modbus protocol, the de facto standard for connecting industrial electronic
devices, has number of security weaknesses such as lack of authentication,
lack of integrity checking of data sent over the protocol. Other protocols send
credential data in clear-text format. These vulnerabilities may grant adversary
an unauthorized access or unauthorized manipulations of values that affect
SCADA operations. Secure DNP3 is a suitable alternative to be used in data
transmission, however, not all software vendors provide support for this protocol.
Table 3.1 lists a sample set of PLC network vulnerabilities as reported in
ICS-CERT repository.






































Firmware is the operating system of controller devices, in particular, PLCs. It
consists of data and code bundled together with several features such as OS kernel
and file system. Firmware is typically written by device vendors. As any software,
a firmware is prone to flaws and security vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities include
buffer overflow, improper input validation, flawed protocol implementation, etc.
In addition, today, most of controller devices run by standard operating systems
to leverage its features. However, using standard OS eliminates the concept of
”security by obscurity” and controllers will inherit vulnerabilities of used OS.
Therefore, PLC vendors offer updates or patches regularly to fix functional bugs
or security flaws which could be done remotely for devices scattered in dispersed
locations.
There are several issues that need to be considered when patching or up-
loading a new firmware to a PLC. For example, patching a PLC should take into
consideration the nature of ICS systems which require the availability of devices
24/7. More importantly, firmware and patches must be certified by vendors
to make sure that they will not break system functionalities. Unfortunately, a
large number of PLC vendors use weak firmware update validation mechanisms
allowing unauthenticated firmware updates [11]. Uploading custom or malicious
firmware could bring the system down, give access to running system and allow
an adversary to have full control of the device. Consequently, arbitrary code
19
can be run, malicious services can be installed, backdoors can be planted, denial
of Service (DoS) attack can be launched, privilege can be escalated, and so
on. Table 3.2 lists a sample set of PLC firmware vulnerabilities as reported in
ICS-CERT repository.
Table 3.2: Examples of PLC firmware vulnerabilities as reported in ICS-CERT
advisories


































3.3 Access Control Vulnerabilities
A PLC is a sensitive component of ICS systems and hence only authorized entities
should be allowed to access it and any such access should be appropriately au-
thenticated. The first layer should be physical access control preventing physical
compromise of the PLC. At the network layer, ICS networks must be protected
by employing DMZs, firewalls, and intrusion detection and prevention systems to
prevent unauthorized intrusion.
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The most common PLC access control vulnerabilities include poor authentication
mechanism, lack of integrity methods, flawed password protection, and flawed
communication protocols. For example, PLC vendors use hidden or hard coded
usernames and passwords to fully control the device. Attackers setup a database of
default usernames and passwords and can brute-force such devices. Once unautho-
rized access is performed, an adversary can retrieve sensitive data, modify values,
manipulate memory, gain privilege, change PLC logic, etc. All these issues are
discussed in details in the following Chapter. Table 3.3 lists a sample set of PLC
firmware vulnerabilities as reported in ICS-CERT repository.









































This chapter highlights PLC access control from three different views. It starts
with physical deployment of PLC and restrictions that must be followed to keep
PLC in a safe place. The second section discusses techniques of protection for a
PLC from external attacks through the network. It followed by password based
access control of PLC and requirements need to be employed in developing pass-
word mechanism. The last section introduces a security analysis of password-based
access control, that we conducted on Siemens PLC, namely, Siemens S7-400
4.1 Physical Access Control
Proper deployment and access control of PLC as well as other ICS controllers mit-
igate significantly security breaches either from internal or external adversaries.
Access control vulnerabilities can be significantly reduced by implementing rec-
ommendations in established standards such as the ANSI/ISA-99 [27]. It is a
complete security life-cycle program that define procedures for developing and de-
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ploying policy and technical solutions to implement secure ICS systems. ISA99 is
based on two main concepts, namely, zones and conduits, whose goal is to separate
various subsystems and components. Devices that share common security require-
ments have to be in the same logical or physical group and the communication
between them take place through conduits. This way, network traffic confiden-
tiality and integrity is protected, DoS attacks are prevented and malware traffic is
filtered. Thus, if any infection takes place, it affects only limited components in a
particular zone. In addition, control system administration must restrict physical
and logical access to ICS devices to only those authorized individuals expected to
be in direct contact with system equipment.
4.2 Network Access Control
ICS network access control is typically implemented in layers. The first layer
is network logical segmentation achieved typically with security technologies
such as firewalls and VPNs. All controller devices, in particular PLCs, must
be located behind firewalls and not connected directly to corporate or other
networks. Most importantly, critical devices should not be exposed directly to
Internet. Remote access to all ICS devices should be through secure tunnels
such as VPNs. Indeed, many vendors provide special appliances for securing
ICS networks. For example, Siemens provides a special type of switch, namely,
Scalance S, with firewall and VPN features to secure the communication
from/to PLCs. Notice that even with full deployment, these technologies may
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not block all breaches due to weak or inadequate configurations and filtering rules.
It is important to note that security countermeasures of SCADA systems
are different from mainstream ones used in traditional IT systems in the means
of operational priorities and risk. In SCADA system, actions and responses must
be in real-time manner. In contrast to IT system, it cannot tolerate delays in
receiving or sending data which may lead to sever consequences. In addition,
anti-virus and encryption techniques are very time and resources consuming.
Moreover, SCADA systems must provide 24/7 monitoring and control processes,
thus patching or replacement of applications or controllers is hard to implement
even if they are ruing with known vulnerabilities. There are a lot more challenges
and differences between The two systems. SCADA Engineers, physical and Cyber
security professionals and system architects need to join together and create
well-established network architecture to limit or prevent unauthorized access to
the SCADA sensitive assets.
4.3 Password Access Control
Password based access control is by far the most commonly used type of access
control and most important as well. The common mistake between PLC vendors is
that they are using built-in password protection (e.g. ”Admin, Admin”, ”Admin,
1234”, etc) to prevent unauthorized access and tampering attacks. One of the
reasons for using default password is that in some cases they need to respond
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quickly to an alarm or critical event. If they used sophisticated password, it
might be difficult to remember or type. Attackers are aware of this vulnerability,
so they are usually prepare a set of default pair of user-name and password to
decrease the time of password cracking. For effective password access control,
important requirements need to be satisfied. In particular, password protection:
• must be enabled whenever possible
• must be properly configured
• must use strong encoding scheme
• must not need high processing operations
• must not use hardcoded credentials
• must be frequently and periodically changed.
In addition, it is highly recommended to delete default accounts or change de-
fault passwords. Unfortunately, not all vendors comply with and enforce these
principles, therefore several password related incidents are reported (Table 3.3).
4.4 Security Analysis of PLC Password Access
Control
As its name indicates, a PLC is programmable, that is, by loading a new program,
the PLC can be reconfigured to function in a different way. To do so, major
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Figure 4.1: PLC Lab Setup
manufacturers of PLC (e.g. Siemens, Modicon Schneider Electric, Allen-Bradley,
etc.) provide integrated software platform to program, debug or configure a
PLC as well as other controllers connected to PLC. Typically, a new program
is loaded by connecting the PLC with an engineering station (equipped with
a control system software) via direct wire or through a LAN after it has been
written and tested at engineering station. In addition to reprogramming the
PLC, the engineering station can send control commands to the PLC such as
start, stop, check status, etc. Therefore, an attacker who can interfere with the
PLC access control mechanism can cause a lot of damage to the whole ICS system.
To carry out a realistic security analysis of PLC access control, we selected a
commonly used PLC model, namely, Siemens S7-400, with its software namely,
Simatic PCS7, and setup a lab including common ICS configuration (Figure 4.1).
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Simatic PCS7 is control system platform used to configure and program controller
devices of Siemens such as PLC. It is equipped with a range of engineering tools
and wide variety of functions designed in graphical user interface and uses COTP
(Connection Oriented Transport Protocol) in the communications between PLCs
and Engineering stations. COTP is an obsolete, unsecured protocol built on the
top of TCP but it is still using by Siemens PCS7 software.
Based on S7-400 documentation, several test cases have been performed
which revealed three access control levels for the PLC, namely, no protection,
write-protection and read/write-protection. The first level of access control,
which is the default level, does not provide any form of access control. Using this
level, any entity (device, station, etc.) can access the PLC processes and data
without restriction. Access is possible provided that the remote entity “speaks”
a PLC supported communication protocol (e.g. COTP, Modbus, Profinet). The
second level, write-protection, provides as its name indicates a write protection
on PLC data and processes. That is, any attempt to modify data or processes
on the PLC (e.g. Load new program, clear data) is password authenticated.
The third level, which is the most restrictive, is read/write-protection. Using
that level, any interaction, that is, read from or write to the PLC is password
authenticated. Through our analysis of password mechanism implemented in




The configuration software, namely, SIMATIC PCS7 accepts any 8 ASCII
characters password to protect PLC form unauthorized access and manipulation
of programs and configurations. If the password is less than 8 characters long,
PCS7 pads it with white spaces. To set a PLC password, a user has to change
the protection level and set the password in the PCS7 hardware configuration
tool before loading the changes to the PLC.
In addition to being loaded to the PLC memory, the password is stored
locally in the engineering station’s local files. In a normal scenario any command
sent to the PLC (e.g. start, stop, clear memory) should be authorized by
providing the password. However, since the password is stored locally in the
engineering station, PCS7 software will ask for the password only one time after
the new configuration is loaded to the PLC. In subsequent interactions, PCS7
will include automatically the password in the packet requests sent to the PLC.
This behaviour can be changed any time through hardware configuration tool.
Bear in mind, that if PLC was protected, it doesn’t execute any command unless
password is supplied.
SIMATIC PCS7 using password to control the access to projects stored lo-
cally in engineering station. Since, this is not in our scope, we ignored it through
our investigation.
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4.4.2 PLC Memory Structure
As mentioned above, setting a password consists in changing the protection level,
selecting a password and then loading the new configuration to the PLC memory.
The latter is organized into labeled blocks. Each block holds a specific type of
information (Figure 4.2). Therefore, information loaded to the PLC is divided
into blocks as well. Mainly, there are two categories of blocks according to what
it holds; blocks that are hold user program and blocks that hold configuration
data.
Most of PLC blocks are used to organized the PLC program into indepen-
dent sections corresponding to individual tasks. Function Block (FB) is a block
that holds user-defined functions with memory to store associated data. Func-
tions (FC) is used to keep frequently used routines in the PLC operations. Data
Block (DB) stores user data. Organization Block (OB) is an interface between
operating system and user program, used to determine the CPU behavior, for
example, define error handling. System Function Block (SFB) and System
Functions (SFC) hold low level functions (libraries) that can be called by user
programs such as handling the clock and run-time meters.
The password is communicated and stored in the System Data Block (SDB). SDB
itself is divided into sub-blocks with different roles. The sub-blocks numbered
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PLC memory block types
Figure 4.2: S7-400 PLC memory structure
download process. The rest of the sub-blocks are divided into two sets: sub-blocks
from 1000 to 1005 which contains some sort of configuration data used in the
first downloading time. In the second time, the configuration is stored in the
sub-blocks from 1006 to 1011 . Thus, in the next time, the first sub-blocks used
to hold the configuration data, and so on.
Loading a new configuration to the PLC yields to delete data of all sub-blocks
of the SDB block, then load new configuration, except the 0000 sub-block which
contains the password. This sub-block is overwritten with a new password. If an
adversary aims at updating the password, he needs to clear the 0000 block first
with a dedicated command and then set a new password with another command,
which is not the case in normal PCS7 process.
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4.4.3 PLC Password Sniffing
Typically, the common strategy for retrieving sensitive information (e.g. pass-
word) from data that is flowing across the network is ”Packet Sniffing” (Figure
4.3).
Methodology
Packet sniffing where packets are intercepted and captured at the Ethernet frame
level. After capturing, the data can be filtered and examined using manual and
automated techniques to review granular-level details within network traffic. It
helps also in identifying traffic patterns and vulnerabilities of a system to penetrate
into it or commit other attacks such as replay attack. The capturing process can
be managed either by installing a script in the targeted machine [28] or monitor-
ing the communication between nodes using dedicated program (e.g. Wireshark).
Next, the recorded packets are filtered based on specific criteria, e.g. protocol or
IP address.
Figure 4.3: Sensitive Information Extraction Steps
Most of standard protocols’ documentations are publicly available which makes it
less difficult to find the location of targeted information. However, for proprietary
protocols, the filtered data can be analyzed by comparing different streams with
each other to locate the similarity and differentiation between them. For example,
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if password is the target, then dump number of streams that have the same config-
urations except the password, compare them using different comparison tools and
try to figure out password location. Note that before you can effectively identify
the information, you need some knowledge about that fields structure, such as,
the policy, length, etc.
Implementation
In order to evaluate the security of the password-based access control, a first
step is to sniff the network packets containing the password. Typical network
sniffing software is used to capture packets exchanged between the engineering
station (PCS7) and the PLC during a password setting process (e.g. Wireshark,
tcpdump). Since password setting is achieved through load configuration
command sent to the PLC, the process is repeated several times with different
passwords to collect a good number of samples. The captured traffic is first
filtered to extract complete TCP streams of the packets which were sent to
PLC only. Packets received from PLC were ignored. The streams are then
compared using byte comparison tools (e.g. Burp Suite Comparator). These
tools help finding similarities and differences between TCP streams. This allowed
to identify the specific packets containing the password and the exact bytes
shift for the password location inside the packets. It turned out that the 8
characters password is encoded in each packet. Hence configuration software in
the engineering station uses an encoding scheme to encode the password before
uploading it to the PLC.
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It is important to note that when the PLC is configured with no-protection
level, sniffed packets during load configuration have the same size as with the
other levels of protection (read protection and read/write protection). Hence,
the packet is padded with random bits (....*.6ES7) which is part of PLC module
number.
4.4.4 Reverse Engineering Password Encoding Scheme
After locating the 8 bytes inside the network packets containing the password, the
next step is to decode the bytes to retrieve the plain-text version of the password.
Methodology
The best practice to break a cipher text starts with well-developed strategy. A
random selection of a tool is a time wasting. There are number of methods that
can be used to crack the password. The Dictionary attack, Hybrid Dictionary
attack, Rainbow table or Brute force attack. The difficulty of cracking depends
on the available information about the password; it falls into four categories, from
hard to easy:
• Cipher-text only where the attacker is presumed access only a set of cipher-
text.
• Known plain-text where the attacker has access to both the plain-text, and
its corresponding encrypted version, cipher-text to reveal the secret key.
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• Chosen plain-text which assumes that the attacker can get the cipher-texts
for random plain-texts. He needs to get information that cut down the
security of the encryption mechanism.
• Chosen cipher-text where the crypt-analyst can gather information by ob-
taining the decryption of chosen cipher-texts.
In some cases, some encoding algorithm would be reasonable and easy to recognize,
e.g. Base64, which we excluded in this experiment. So, in our case , we have the
plain-text and cipher-text too and a kind of hybrid dictionary table consisting
of plain-text and its corresponding cipher-text. Before using a specific decoding
algorithm, we did try the possibility of using full-fledged cryptographic, hashing
functions, typical encoding schemes such as URL encoding, etc.
Implementation
Full-fledged cryptographic (DES, AES, RC4, etc.) as well as hashing (MD5,
SHA512, etc.) functions are excluded in the investigation because of four rea-
sons:
1. There is no key exchange stage involved before password communication,
This holds for cryptographic functions.
2. If cryptographic and hashing functions were used, the encoded password
bytes would be completely shuffled compared to the plain text version, which
is not the case here (the cipher text is encoded byte by byte).
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3. Cryptographic and hashing functions are too processing intensive for PLCs.
PLC is controlling very critical processes, that means any delay in delivering
data may cause troubles. Moreover, PLC main function is to facilitate
industry operations. So, it is not practical to use such functions.
4. Size of cipher text in AES, MD5, SHA512, etc. is fixed and it is more than
the size of encoded password found in the traffic.
The reverse-engineering started by trying typical encoding schemes, namely, URL
encoding, ASCII Hex, variants of Xor (single-byte, multiple-byte, rolling, etc.)
using Burp Suite tool in Kali Linux. However, none of these typical schemes
retrieved the plain text version of the password, pre-set in our samples.
Figure 4.4: PLC Password Encoding
Xor is a very common encoding scheme that is suitable for resource limited
hardware devices. As mentioned above, the password encoding is not using
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typical Xor (single-byte, multiple-byte, etc.). Taking into consideration the fact
that the encoding is done byte-by-byte and the requirement of a lightweight
encoding algorithm, we focused on trying customized Xor transformations. To
this end, a representative list of (plain-text password, encoded-text password)
pairs have been sampled from the network (Table 4.1). Then, using automated
scripts to brute-force each byte, we could successfully reverse-engineer the Xor
based encoding scheme. A graphical representation of the nested Xor based
encoding scheme is shown in Figure 4.4.
Table 4.1: Sample of Passwords and Corresponding Encoded Passwords
Password (ASCII) Encoded Password (Hex)
a a a a a a a a cb cb 00 00 cb cb 00 00
b b b b b b b b c8 c8 00 00 c8 c8 00 00
a a b b c c d d cb cb 03 03 ca ca 04 04
b b a a d d c c c8 c8 03 03 cd cd 04 04
First of all, the first character in the password (P1) is xored with “0xAA”, so
with second character. The third encoded character (C3) is produced by xoring
(P1) with (P3) and fourth character in encoded password (C4) is produced by
xoring (P2) and (P4). The fifth encoded character (C5) is the result of xoring
(P1), (P3), (P5) and “0xAA”. (C6) is the result of xoring (P2), (P4), (P6) and
“0xAA”. The last two encoded character are produced as follows: (P1) xored
with (P3), (P5) and (P7) to produced (C7), and (P2) xored with (P4), (P6) and
(P8) to produce (C8).
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It is important to note that the PLC is using two variants of the encoding
scheme: one used to load a configuration to the PLC and the other is used during






This chapter presents a security analysis of the communication between PLC,
namely, Siemens S7-400, and engineering stations equipped with SIMATIC PCS7.
We conducted bunch of attacks, namely, replay normal commands attack, Man in
the middle (MiTM) attack , clear PLC memory, update CPU password, etc. In
the following sections, we explain how to launch each attack and what tools are
needed.
5.1 Replay Attack
As a consequence of compromising the password based PLC access control,
mentioned in chapter 4.4, several concrete attacks can be carried out on the
PLC, ranging from simple replay to unauthorized password update attacks. A
replay attack on the PLC consists of recording a sequence of packets related to
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a certain legitimate command and then replaying it later without authorization.
The attack consists of 3 steps: starting a given command (stop, start, load
configuration, clear memory block, etc.), capturing the packets, and replaying
the captured packets at a later time, see figure 5.1. The captured packets of a
command need to be processed before replay it by discarding all packets received












Figure 5.1: Attacks general approach
There are mainly three challenges that need to be addressed in order to replay
packets successfully. First, packet headers (IP address and TCP port) need
to be rewritten and checksums need to be recomputed. The modified IP
address and TCP port correspond to attacker machine. Second, sequence and
acknowledgement numbers need to be changed, otherwise the PLC will tag them
as duplicates or out of order and will discard them. Third, packets need to be
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sent in the right order and timing, in particular, some packets should be sent
after receiving some packets in the other direction. These problems have been
recently observed by Maynard et al. [29].
There are several useful tools used in replay attack, for example tcpreplay.
This tool can be used to change IP address, Tcp port, recompute checksum, etc.
However, the attack was failed because of TCP/IP kernel at the PLC discarded
most of the packets due to two reasons: First, the sequence and acknowledgement
numbers were not changed by the tool before replayed it. So, PLC considered
it as a duplicate or out or order. Second, the tool didn’t wait for a reply from
the PLC and it sent the packets one after another. To overcome these obstacles
and to guarantee that the replayed packets are accepted by the TCP/IP kernel
at the PLC, we resorted to write a customized python script using scapy [30].
Scapy is a powerful packet manipulation program written in python and hence
can be easily used in python scripts. It features a variety of packet manipulation
capabilities including: sniffing and replaying packets in the network, network
scanning, tracerouting, etc. However, the most useful scapy features for our
replay attack are the ability to rewrite the sequence and acknowledgement
numbers and to match requests and replies.
Updating the sequence and acknowledgement numbers consists of recalcu-
lating these numbers and rewriting them with scapy. Manipulating packet
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headers using scapy is straightforward since any packet field is simply accessible
by the dot operator (e.g. ip.src, tcp.flags, rcv[TCP].seq). Initially, random
sequence and acknowledgement numbers are chosen. Then, at each packet
sending, the numbers are incremented and added to the next packet. Scapy offers
variety of Send functions, which is used to send a packet to the other end of the
communication. Some packets do not require an acknowledgement, so sendp()
can be used. It takes as an input the packet and the network interface. On the
other hand, packets which require a response, Scapy offers several functions. This
function srp1() is the most suitable one for our attack, as it sends and receives
packets in layer 2 and returns only the first answer from which we can extract
the sequence number.
Algorithm 1 shows the core of the python script using the scapy features.
The REPLAY subroutine takes as input the pcap file, the network interface,
the attacker’s IP address and port number. In addition, arbitrary values are
chosen to initialize the ACK and RSTACK numbers. The for loop inside the
subroutine goes through the packets one by one. For each packet, IP and TCP
checksums are removed (lines 7) so that the network interface card recalculates
newer values, the source IP and port numbers are updated (lines 8 and 9), the
sequence numbers are incremented (lines 11), the packet is replayed using either
scapy sendp function (for SYN and RST packets) or the scapy srp1 function
(lines 13 and 18).
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Algorithm 1 Replay a sequence of captured packets using Scapy
1: function replay(pcapfile, eth interface, srcIP, srcPort)
2: recvSeqNum ← 0
3: SYN ← True
4: for packet in rdpcap(pcapfile) do
5: ip ← packet[IP]
6: tcp ← packet[TCP]
7: del ip.chksum . Clearing the checksums
8: ip.src ← srcIP . Specify the attacker machine IP and PORT
9: ip.sport ← srcPort
10: if tcp.flags == ACK or tcp.flags == RSTACK then
11: tcp.ack ← recvSeqNum+1
12: if SYN or tcp.flags == RSTACK then
13: sendp(packet, iface=eth interface)




18: rcv ← srp1(packet, iface=eth interface)
19: recvSeqNum ← rcv[TCP].seq
20: end for
21: end function
First of all, the above python program has been tested using two attack scenarios.
In the first scenario, the replay attack was launched from the same host (IP
address) used in the capture process, that is, the engineering station with the
configuration software. In the second scenario, the replay attack was launched
from a different host on the same network, that is, the attacker machine with
Kali. In each scenario, two types of commands are tried, namely, start and stop
which require password authentication. The replay attack was successful in both
scenarios for both types of commands. Hence, an unknown attacker machine
(without appropriate configuration software) on the same network, can turn the
PLC ON or OFF by simply replaying a start or stop command without knowing
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the PLC password. This clearly might cause significant damage to a SCADA
system. We extended the attack and use this program to replay other commands.
The attacks are detailed in the following sections
5.2 Man-In-The-Middle (MiTM) Attack
Basically, some of PLC networking facilities are based on TCP/IP model. In this
model, Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) is used to link network address (e.g.
IPv4 address) to physical address (MAC). When a sender host needs another
host’s MAC address residing in the same LAN, it broadcasts an ARP request to
all hosts in the network. ARP request contains the IP address of a host which
the sender needs its MAC address. So, in a typical scenario, only the owner of
that IP address responses to that request with an ARP reply which contains its
MAC address. Since ARP is a stateless protocol, network host accepts any ARP
reply in despite of whether it requested it or not. In addition, it updated and
overwrote the ARP entries whenever it receives new APR reply packet even if
the existence entries have not yet expired. Thus, it is most likely prone to MiTM
attack implementing what it is known as ARP Poisoning.
ARP Poisoning attack is a technique by which an attacker floods a falsi-
fied ARP messages over a LAN. As a result, an attacker associates his MAC
address with the IP address of a legitimate host in the network. Thus an
attacker implant himself between two hosts and all the traffic tunneled through
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SCADA network
Figure 5.2: Man-in-The-Middle Attack
his machine. There are two types of MiTM attacks; passive and active attack.
Passive attack simply watching the communicated data between two hosts and
hence breaking the confidentiality and stealing sensitive data. A more dangerous
type is the active attack, where attacker can be able to intercept, modify and
even stop the traffic causing Denial of Service.
In our attack, we implemented ARP Poising attack between engineering
station equipped with PCS7 and the PLC using Ettercap tool [31]. The attack
was successfully and all the traffic between PC7 and PLC was passing through
attacker machine using Kali. By utilizing this attack with the previous one,
replay, we can conduct several attacks and tamper with the packet’s contents
and commands sent by PCS 7 to the PLC. The following sections illustrate the
attacks in details.
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5.3 Unauthorized Password Setting and Updat-
ing
As detailed in Chapter 4, packets between the engineering station and the
PLC are sent in clear format including the encoded passwords. Based on a
representative set of samples, we could locate the password inside packets and
reverse-engineer the password encoding scheme. This allowed us to retrieve the
plain-text password from the network traffic between the engineering station and
the PLC.
In a legitimate scenario, the PLC password is set and updated from the
configuration software, in particular, from Hardware configuration component, in
the engineering station. Typically, in case of password update, the old password
should be supplied first. Due to the PLC access control vulnerability, an attacker
can set and update the password by replaying malicious packets directly to the
PLC.
When a password is written on the PLC, the SDB (System Data Block) is
overwritten. The load process first checks the SDB to see if it’s clean or has a
configuration already. If there is a configuration, the process checks if a password
is set or not. Hence, there are two main cases: setting a configuration with a
password for the first time, and updating an old configuration that has already a
password.
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Case 1: PLC Memory is Cleared
For the first case, setting a password for the first time requires to record a password
setting packets sequence used in an old session and then replaying them. Since
the goal is mainly to set the password, only packets in charge of overwriting block
[0000] in the SDB, which contain the password, are kept (More details in Chapter
4.4.2). All other packets are not needed in the unauthorized password setting
attack. Hence, to set a new password without going through the configuration
software, the password should be encoded using the cracked algorithm (Chapter












Figure 5.3: Unauthorized Password Setting Attack
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Case 2: PLC memory Is Protected
For the second case, the goal of the attack is to set a password while the PLC is
already protected by an existing password. Using the same procedure as the first
case as-is did not work. After investigation it turned out that the sub-block [0000]
of the SDB holding the password cannot be overwritten by replaying packets. As
a result, the PLC keeps sending a FIN packet whenever an attempt is made to
overwrite the SDB sub-block [0000]. To overcome this problem, we resorted to a
two-stage procedure where initially we clear the content of [0000] sub-block and
then we replayed packets to overwrite only that block with a new password. Since
there is no legal command to just clean [0000] sub-block, we looked for a sequence
of packets to delete a different block and we modified them to delete [0000] sub-
block. With this two-stage procedure, the password is successfully updated by a
different workstation without the configuration software and without knowing the
old password.
5.4 Clear PLC Memory
The first stage of the unauthorized password updating attack consists in clearing
the [0000] sub-block of the SDB without a need for the password. This step can
be generalized to clear other blocks. More importantly, in an extreme use case,
all PLC memory blocks can be cleared. With this vulnerability, an attacker can
launch a DoS attack by clearing all PLC memory data and turning the PLC into
unresponsive device.
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5.5 Unauthorized Change of PLC User Program
User program is set of functions and data required to control specific automation
task. The program comprises number of blocks correspond to individual tasks in
controlling a machine. There are several types of blocks used in SIMATIC PCS
7 software; Logic blocks and Data blocks. Logic blocks contains sections of the
program and variables structured in Organization Block (OB), System function
blocks (SFB), system functions (SFC), Function blocks (FB) and Functions (FC).
These blocks programmed by different programming languages such as Ladder
Logic (LAD), Function Block Diagram (FBD), or Statement List (STL). Data
blocks contains values of a machine or plant to control.
In this attack, OB and FB are programmed with set of codes and declared
some variables. These blocks then downloaded to the PLC and sniffed the
network packets of this command. The aim was to change a value of “preset
speed” variable in FB and replay the command directly to CPU. So, this process
was repeated several times to have enough samples for analysing and extracting
the location of that value in the packets stream. At the end, the location was
successfully specified and we prepared two pcap files for the attack, one is
containing a password using in case a PLC is protected and the other one without
a password. The attack was successful in both cases and we could easily replayed
the packet and changed the value of the “preset speed” variable.
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5.6 Summary and Mitigation
In typical IT networks, the basic protection measure against such network
attacks (replay, password stealing, etc.) is to use encrypted communications.
This assumes that both ends of the communication can encrypt and decrypt
messages. While the engineering station and the configuration software can
support encrypted communications, most of PLCs do not have cryptographic
capabilities. The alternative to have cryptographic capabilities implemented
within the PLC in addition to standard control features, is to place the PLC
behind a network security device (e.g. firewall, secure router, etc.). An example
of such devices is the Scalance S security module for PLCs which comes with
VPN and IPSec features. If configured correctly, all the communications from/to
the PLC will go through the security module. All the communications between
the security module and any other device should be encrypted. However, the
communication between the PLC and the security module is in clear. Therefore,
the PLC should be connected physically to the security device only. All the other
devices in the ICS network (engineering station, input/output devices, RTUs,
etc.) should communicate with the PLC through the security module.
Although several security advisories in the ICS-CERT recommend using
such security modules as mitigating solutions, it is not still widely adopted
because of budget and practical (the need to reconfigure the ICS system, the
wiring, etc.) considerations. The 6 years old Stuxnet attack is a manifestation of
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this fact. Indeed, PLCs got compromised because they were directly connected
to infected engineering stations.
Another mitigating approach would be to use a network intrusion detec-
tion system in the LAN and detect malicious attacks (replay, PLC memory block
clear command, password updated, etc.). Since communication is sent in clear
between the engineering station and the PLC, generating network signatures for







The general purpose of signature-based detection is to identify and alert the oc-
currence of specific event, odd traffic, unusual header characteristics, an attempt
of attack, to name a few. it ranges from very simple signature where it looks for a
header value, to very complex one that a state of a connection is tracked or deep
protocol analysis is performed. Simple signature may generate more false posi-
tives, on the other hand, complex or very specific signature may generate more
false negatives as the characteristics of an event may change over a time. The
key advantages of signature-based systems are the low rate of false positives, the
effectiveness and accuracy in detecting the known security events. It maintains a
database of signatures or attributes of known events (e.g. attack) and compare
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them against the monitored packets on the network.
The design of a signature depends on how it is implemented in real world not
only on protocol standards as many implementations violate protocol standards.
Basically, the signature should represent the unique characteristics of an event
which can be identified by collecting large number of samples and analyze them
by checking for specific features such as: Packet header values, Unique set of
characters in packet payload either by using regular expression or specific words,
Number of packets exchanged, Size of packets and so on. Finally, evaluate the
signatures in terms of detection rate and processing performance.
6.2 Introduction
The communication traffic between PLC and engineering station is not encrypted,
as discussed in Chapter 5. Thus, some clear-text words that indicate some useful
information about the PLC and the sent commands can be easily noticed in the
network traffic. For example, in each command executed by PCS7, the software
first identify the model of the PLC it negotiates with. The model is located
in the PLC memory and sent during the communication traffic in a normal
text format. In case the PLC was protected, all commands must be authorized
to be executed. The password is provided and can be noticed in the traffic
although it is encoded, (see Chapter 4.4). We conducted deep analysis of these
traffic for several operations using wide variety of tools contained in Kali Linux OS.
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In this chapter, we introduce the first layer of defense against attacks tar-
geting PLC. The implemented security measurement is Intrusion Detection
System (IDS). It inspects the traffic between PLC and Engineering station
equipped with PCS7. The IDS looks for several commands sent to PLC, such as
start, stop, etc. In addition, it can be used to detect some attacks launched from
internal or external network targeting PLC (Figure 6.1).
Figure 6.1: General Detection Steps
The goal is to develop signatures for each command that can differentiated
between them while monitoring the network traffic and notify the system admin-
istrator whenever an action or instance of an attack takes place. Signature-based
approach is quite effective for detecting known attacks, as it usually captures
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the distinguished properties of the attacks it is designed to detect. Then, the
signatures are evaluated using Snort IDS placed into PLC network along with
Engineering station and attacker machine hosting Kali OS connected altogether
by a switch (Figure 6.2).
Figure 6.2: Intrusion Detection System in SCADA network
6.3 Detecting Replayed Packets
Replay attack is the main attack that is implemented in our experiments. A
tool was developed and used to launch various attacks against PLC. There are
many ways to implement such attacks. Normally, the prevention and detection
techniques will differ. In this work, it was a straight replay of captured packets
correspond to a command and replayed at a later time (Chapter 5).
The detection process is implemented as follows: PLC must only receive
commands from a specific IP address, which is for Engineering station. So,
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any command sent to PLC from other machine is considered as an attack
and the system will raise an alarm to SCADA control center. In addition,
packet’s content-based signature is created to recognize the commands sent to
PLC. It is known that replay attack takes longer execution time than normal
operations. Thus, this has been investigated and we found differences between
them as expected. All these properties together constitute a detection formula
for each command and can distinguish normal traffic from a malicious one.
Some commands are not usually being used in normal situations. Detecting such
commands outside a “Scheduled time” is considered a malicious action.
The implemented attacks using replay technique are as follows: Replay
PLC start command, Replay PLC stop command, Replay password updating
command, Replay PLC memory clear command and Replay user program blocks.
6.4 Start/Stop PLC Replay Attack Detection
First detection criteria is that these commands must be only issued from dedi-
cated engineering station machine with fixed IP address. Stuxnet attack exploited
this point where engineering station was installed in a laptop and that laptop was
compromised by a malicious software installed from a USB. Second, we figured out
a unique packet’s content for both, start/stop PLC commands. Start operation
can be done in many ways in PCS7, namely, warm start, cold start and normal
start. All these variations have a common packet content that can be used to
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construct a signature along with the IP address of the engineering station. In
addition, start/stop PLC are sensitive operations, i.g. PLC can run for long time
controlling sensors and actuators and only be stopped in rare cases. Thus, detect-
ing such commands in unscheduled time is not a normal operation and must be
notified. The following snippet illustrated start/stop Snort detection rules.
############################################
# Rules for Start/Stop PLC Detection
############################################
alert tcp $Eng_Stn_IP any -> $PLC_IP $PLC_PORT
(content:"28 00 00 00 00 00 00 fd 00 00 09 50 5f 50 52 4f 47 52 41 4d—”;
rawbytes; msg: "Normal Start command sent to PLC from Engineering Station";
sid: 1000001;)
alert tcp !$Eng_Stn_IP any -> $PLC_IP $PLC_PORT
(content:"28 00 00 00 00 00 00 fd 00 00 09 50 5f 50 52 4f 47 52 41 4d—”;—
rawbytes; msg: "malicious user send Start command to PLC";
sid: 1000002;)
alert tcp $Eng_Stn_IP any -> $PLC_IP $PLC_PORT
(content:"00 29 00 00 00 00 00 09 50 5F 50 52 4F 47 52 41 4D—”;—
rawbytes; msg: "Normal Stop command sent to PLC from Engineering Station";
sid: 1000003;)
alert tcp !$Eng_Stn_IP any -> $PLC_IP $PLC_PORT
(content:"00 29 00 00 00 00 00 09 50 5F 50 52 4F 47 52 41 4D—”;—
rawbytes; msg: "malicious user send Stop command to PLC";
sid: 1000004;)
To trigger Snort rules, the packet should match the rule header as well as rule
options. Normally, rule header contains the protocol (e.g. TCP), source IP ad-
dress, source port number, destination IP address and destination port number.
In our detection rules, PLC is a variable that correspond to PLC IP address and
PLC_PORT corresponds to typical PLC port 102 that is used in all communica-
tions with PCS7 while Eng_Stn corresponds to IP address of engineering station
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that equipped with SIMATIC PCS7. The above rules are aimed to detect any
occurrence of Start/Stop commands either from legitimate user or attacker ma-
chine. Typically, Snort alerts are sent to SCADA control center and it will react
according to the severity of the received alarm.
6.5 Detecting MiTM Attacks
This attack is implemented mainly by spoofing an IP address of an entity in a
network and hijack the communication channel. In our scenario, attacker represent
himself as the other end of communication, e.g. for a PLC, the attacker is the
engineering station. On the other side, the attacker is the PLC. All the traffic goes
through attacker machine. However, MiTM by itself is not an easy attack, if the
type of ARP table entry is static, ARP spoofing is not possible. In our detection
phase, Snort has capability to detect ARP poisoning attacks by modifying the
Snort configuration file snort.conf, specifically, remove the “#” from this line:
preprocessor arpspoof and define the IP and MAC addresses of the devices in
the network, namely, PLC, engineering station and IDS. This is illustrated in the
snippet below. In addition, the commands execution time will differ accordingly.
The request first sent to attacker machine, he might alter something, then send
it to the intended destination. Time execution measurement will be as follows:
Whenever Snort detect SYN request, it starts a timer and ends it when detecting
RST flag. During this connection stream, if any command is detects, IDS will
compare it with a previously defined time execution of such command. If there is
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any difference, that means an attacker sent that command and IDS alerts system
control center.
############################################
# Detecting MiTM Attack
############################################
preprocessor arpspoof
preprocessor arpspoof_detect_host: $Eng_Stn_IP $Eng_Stn_Mac
preprocessor arpspoof_detect_host: $PLC_IP $PLC_Mac
preprocessor arpspoof_detect_host: $IDS_IP $IDS_Mac
6.6 Detecting PLC Memory Clear Command
This operation is very crucial to SCADA system as it clears everything in the
memory, configuration information, control programs, etc. An engineer may re-
quest this command in very rare cases, e.g. during test phases, upgrading the
system, to name a few. Thus, observing this command in the traffic raises doubts
for possible attack that can convert PLC to unresponsive device and cause Denial
of Service (DoS).
The detection system will check the sender IP address to verify that this com-
mand is originated by a legitimate user machine. In addition, it will check the
time of sending this command. The system can verify whether this command is
“clear memory” or others by looking for a specific contents in the packets. In our
implementation, we developed Snort rules to detect the occurrence of request to
clear memory. The following snippet pertain to inspect the traffic and alert for
authorized and unauthorized attempts to clear PLC memory.
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############################################
# Rules for Clear Memory Detection
############################################
alert tcp $Eng_Stn_IP any -> $PLC_IP $PLC_PORT
(content:"00 01 12 08 12 41 0c 00 00 00 00 00—”; rawbytes;—
msg: "Normal user send clear memory command to PLC"; sid: 1000005)
alert tcp any any -> $PLC_IP $PLC_PORT
(content:"00 01 12 08 12 41 0c 00 00 00 00 00—”; rawbytes;—
msg: "malicious user send clear memory command to PLC"; sid: 1000006)
6.7 Detecting Unauthorized Password Update
Command
The password is updated through Hardware configuration tool, it does not
have specific command but updated during configuration download process. As
mentioned in Chapter 4.4.2, the password is located in block [0000] of type SDB.
In our attacks, there are two main cases: setting PLC password for the first
time where PLC memory is empty of data, and updating an old configuration
that has already a password (Chapter 5.3). Although in both cases we used the
same command, however, the attacks behaviour and the detection rules are both
different.
Since the memory is empty in first attack case, no deletion or overwritten
is required for the password block. Thus, the packets which are in charge of
setting the password are simply replayed. The IDS has two signature for this
operation. First it looks for the request of engineering station to download this
sub-block. Second it looks for PCS7 Program Invocation (PI) service INSE
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which is a request to activate the block. Once these contents observed in the
traffic, it means that a block [0000] is downloaded. These signatures are the same
for both, attacks and normal request. The difference will be in the source IP
address since the IP address of engineering station is known to the IDS.
The second attack case is using a malformed command which is delete
sub-block [0000] first then update the password. In normal download process,
this block is never deleted, it is overwritten. However, in the attack scenario, that
didn’t work. So, we modified a delete command for a random block, e.g. [2001]
by changing the number of block to [0000]. The IDS will inspect the traffic for
this command, which is only used in our attack. One last case is failed password
attempts. A customized signature is created to detect failed authentications. The
following rules illustrate all signatures for detecting password updating process.
6.8 Evaluation and Summary
In this work, we conducted deep security analysis of the communication between
PLC and engineering station. We created signatures for several commands for
detection purposes. A key advantages of this detection method is:
• Signatures are easy to develop and efficient if you know what network be-
havior you are trying to identify.
• The amount of power needed to perform these checks is minimal for a con-
fined rule set. This is crucial for SCADA systems in which data transmission
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############################################
# Rules for Password Update Detection
############################################
alert $Eng_Stn_IP any -> $PLC_IP $PLC_PORT
(content:"5f 30 42 30 30 30 30 30 50 0d 31—”; rawbytes;—
msg: "Request sent to PLC to download sub-block [0000] from Engineering
station"; sid: 1000007)
alert !$Eng_Stn_IP any -> $PLC_IP $PLC_PORT
(content:"5f 30 42 30 30 30 30 30 50 0d 31—”; rawbytes;—
msg: "Request sent to PLC to download sub-block [0000] from malicious
user"; sid: 1000008)
alert $Eng_Stn_IP any -> $PLC_IP $PLC_PORT
(content:"30 42 30 30 30 30 30 50 05 5f 49 4e 53 45—”; rawbytes;—
msg: "Request sent to PLC to activate sub-block [0000] from Engineering
station"; sid: 1000009)
alert !$Eng_Stn_IP any -> $PLC_IP $PLC_PORT
(content:"30 42 30 30 30 30 30 50 05 5f 49 4e 53 45—”; rawbytes;—
msg: "Request sent to PLC to activate sub-block [0000] from malicious
user"; sid: 1000010)
alert !$Eng_Stn_IP any -> $PLC_IP $PLC_PORT
(content:"01 00 30 42 30 30 30 30 30 41 05 5f 44 45 4c 45—”; rawbytes;—
msg: "Attacker deleted sub-block[0000]"; sid: 1000011)
delay is not affordable.
• No false-positive or false-negative is generated since it looks for a specific
well-selected packet content which is transmitted in plainly manner.
Table 6.1 illustrates the developed detection signatures in each work. However,
the weakness of this approach is that it can not detect zero-day attack since its
signature is not yet developed. Also, if Siemens updated the commands, these
signatures might not work. This is the nature of this approach, it has to be
updated as long as new update is released.
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Table 6.1: Comparing our work with others
Attacks Detection Our Work Oman & Phillips Morris et al.
Replay Attack X
CPU Start / Stop X
MiTM X
Password update X
clear memory X X







The vulnerabilities, attacks and detection methods reported in this thesis have
been tested and validated on a very common PLC, namely S7-400, with an
updated firmware. However, based on the advisories and alerts in ICS-CERT
repository, several other PLCs are vulnerable to similar attacks. The attacks are
possible because of the common practice of connecting the PLC directly to the
engineering station through a typical LAN. With that setting, any station or
device in the same LAN can carry out all the attacks described above. Securing
a site with an IDS alone is not effective, integrating an IDS into a network that
has well thought out security capabilities can greatly enhance the security of a
network.
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As a general security measure, controlling network access to vital SCADA
components is strongly recommended with proper mechanisms in order to run
the system in a protected IT environment. Organizations have to perform
impact analysis, risk assessment and take defensive measures to mitigate the
consequences of exploitation of vulnerabilities. In detail, They have to:
• Ensure that ICS components or systems are not accessible from the Internet
and minimize the exposure to the network.
• Isolate filed networks and devices from business network using e.g. Firewall.
• Use secure mechanism for remote access, e.g. VPNs. It is important to note
that VPN itself might has vulnerabilities and must use the most current
version.
7.2 Future Work
As mentioned in Chapter 3, PLC is suffering from several vulnerabilities.
In this work we focused on communication flaws exist in Siemens PLC and
PCS7 software. This work can be extended to analyze the communication
between PLC and HMI, PLC and sensors, etc. The best detection solution for
our focus area is signature-based IDS what we implemented. However, this
may not be the best for other solution as it has a lack in detection zero-day attacks.
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Another area is firmware analysis which goes through analyzing the strength and
capability of validation algorithm implemented in PLC to detect any modification
in the firmware. Firmware is the OS of the PLC, if an attacker compromised it,
he can change the behaviour of PLC, implant backdoors, etc.
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